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As al Qaeda continues to reconceptualize the brand image that
it sells to its Western consumers, America's law enforcement
community must fundamentally reexamine its assumptions about
homegrown terrorism. Over the past decade, the arrests of many
Americans on terrorism-related charges hinged on their illicit
operational activities. These activities include seeking to acquire
bomb-making materials, fundraising in the name of al Qaeda, or
clandestinely communicating with known terrorist cells outside the
United States. The collective focus of law enforcement has been on
thwarting attempts by individuals in this country to mount a
terrorist attack.
But given the way that al Qaeda has retooled itself as a media
organization as opposed to a terrorist group vis-a-vis its American
j Managing Director, Gronus Global, LLC; Author of GLOBAL JIHADISM:
THEORY AND PRACTICE (2008); Director of Research, Combating Terrorism Center
at West Point, 2004-2008; Graduate Fellow, Counterterrorism Center at the
Central Intelligence Agency, 2003.
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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/22/al-qaedas-armies-of one.
2. A comprehensive list of terrorism-related arrests broken out by year can
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support base, conventional indicators and warnings no longer serve
their purpose. The al Qaeda movement has been undergoing a
strategic recalibration in the way it seeks to spread its ideology in
the West over the past several years. Rather than advancing itself as
a terrorist organization that uses the media, al Qaeda in the West
has portrayed itself as a media movement that happens to promote
terronsm.
It now prods its followers in this country to get involved in
advancing al Qaeda's interests. That may or may not include
conducting terrorist attacks. In fact, according to the American
Yemeni cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who is now the poster child of al
Qaeda's organization in Yemen, there are at least forty-four
alternative ways to support al Qaeda without necessarily joining the
frontlines.
In short, al Qaeda has sought to level the playing field so that
no matter who somebody is or what resources they have at their
disposal, they can feel like they are an equal part of al Qaeda's
global movement. No longer does one need to die in Iraq or
Afghanistan to be al Qaeda. One need not attend a Pakistani
training camp or fight alongside their brothers in Algeria or
Chechnya. Al Qaeda's revised position is that there is no longer a
distinction between the frontlines and the rear; there is no
difference between the military conflict and the cultural conflict.
Conducting violence and uploading videos are now equal parts of a
collective whole.
The problem for law enforcement in this country is that
attempts to conduct or support acts of terrorism are illegal, but
spreading a message through the media is not necessarily illegal.
Certainly there are ways to prosecute threatening messages and
hostile content, and those charges are becoming increasingly
leveraged by law enforcement seeking to counteract this growing
problem of vocal al Qaeda supporters. But threatening
communication charges are a far cry from material support to
terrorism charges, even though rhetoric is now viewed by terrorist
organizations themselves as a viable and praiseworthy way of
3. DANIEL KIMMAGE, AL-QAEDA CENTRAL AND THE INTERNET (2010), available at
http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs
/kimmage2_0.pdf.
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supporting their global ambitions.
Further complicating the job of prosecutors and law
enforcement is that subcriminal advancement of al Qaeda's
message in this country through media is becoming more difficult
to discern from other Islamic activist groups-organizations who
might actually shun al Qaeda's message, method and politics. But
as al Qaeda supporters increasingly tuck their messages into more
common rhetoric, it forces law enforcement-often not well
trained to make those nuanced distinctions-to either overpolice
or ignore what might be a concerning message.
This classic insurgency strategy, where the fighters seek to blur
the distinctions between themselves and the host population,
creates a situation that can only be in al Qaeda's favor. If law
enforcement is perceived as overpolicing the Islamic community-
even if their goal is to make the kinds of nuanced distinctions
necessary to separate extremist militant supporters from others-
they may inadvertently alienate themselves with the Muslim
American community. This is precisely what groups like al Qaeda
are hoping to achieve: outsourcing the radicalization of Muslims to
America's law enforcement.
In short, this new approach of softening their message to make
it less openly militant and more rhetorical as opposed to
operational in nature has changed the rules of the game for law
enforcement and criminal prosecutors. The Internet is the new
battle space and it is one where the youth have the advantage. It is
a space that allows for anonymity and disproportionate impact.
It should, therefore, come as no surprise that more individuals
being charged with terrorism-related crimes are also found using
the Internet, either as the vehicle with which they committed their
crimes or in concert with their criminal behavior in the physical
world. It is increasingly important to examine the precise nature of
this activity. Even though not illegal in nature, the activity itself has
become a cornerstone of al Qaeda's ideology and approach to
recruiting and mobilizing in the United States.
This article will provide a recap of recent U.S.-based arrests
where the individuals charged with material support of terrorism
used the Internet in the course of their activities. It will create a
typology of the nature and extent of online support for al Qaeda by
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I. AL QAEDA'S STRATEGIC MOVE ONLINE
One of the primary ways in which al Qaeda supporters have
sought to retool their arsenal is to retreat to the Internet Rather
than building bombs, American al Qaeda supporters are being told
that they can upload a video. Rather than acquiring weapons,
American al Qaeda supporters can publish a magazine. Any action
in the name of al Qaeda is, for al Qaeda, advancing the overall
mission. The point is less about taking action as it is about
garnering interest and fomenting a revolution.
Federal, state, and local law enforcement in this country find
themselves in a situation where they must identify emerging plots
from Americans seeking to execute acts of terrorism, yet the
individuals under surveillance are talking openly and aggressively
only about the need for terrorism. Both courses of action are
viable from al Qaeda's perspective, but one falls beneath the
criminal threshold-making it difficult to do anything about.
Furthermore, it is al Qaeda's hope that their Internet-based
supporters will organically and spontaneously decide to take action
at some point, further complicating the task for law enforcement.
The United States does not have the resources necessary to actively
monitor everyone who openly supports al Qaeda. Furthermore,
open support is not illegal: it is speech that is protected under the
First Amendment.
In the mid-2000's, little attention was paid by law enforcement
or prosecutors to an individual's extremist Internet activities unless
it was viewed as being explicitly criminal in nature. In the rare
instance that a criminal complaint mentioned a suspect's Internet
usage, it was usually offered as a general aside, noting, for example,
that a suspect had browsed extremist websites.
Since at least 2008, however, America's counterterrorism
community has increasingly recognized that subcriminal Internet
activity can be both problematic and telling about the extent to
which an individual is engaged in nefarious activities. That
recognition is increasingly manifesting itself in the growing amount
of detail now appearing in criminal complaints about an
individual's Internet activities. This information includes specific
information about extremist websites they may have visited and
hostile videos that they may have downloaded. Full-text chat
transcripts, Facebook posts, and even comments to YouTube videos
are now being included in criminal complaints as a way of
demonstrating the scope of an individual's extremist activities.
5228 [Vol. 37:5
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As law enforcement tries to make sense of how to police an
illegal movement that is increasingly operating in plain sight, al
Qaeda's American-focused messaging is seeking to empower even
more activity. Since at least 2005, the al Qaeda organization has
made a notable shift in prioritization from pursuing terrorist
operations in the physical world to inspiring and equipping their
global movement in the virtual world with the resources they
needed to be effective.
Al Qaeda's movement now translates more of their media
products into English and directly appeals to Americans in their
messaging. Al Qaeda's franchise group in Yemen, having recruited
two high-profile Americans into their organization, now releases an
English-language Internet magazine specifically focused on
mobilizing western youth for al Qaeda. In many ways, al Qaeda has
transcended itself as a terrorist organization and is looking more
like a media enterprise each year. The result of al Qaeda's shift to
messaging in cyberspace has started to show in the United States
where a growing number of American citizens are openly
supporting, and in some cases plotting to conduct acts of terrorism
in the name of, al Qaeda and its global movement. A great deal of
that. support occurs on the Internet, as does some of the
operational planning, coordination, and fundraising.
II. MOBILIZING AN AMERICAN AL QAEDA FROM YEMEN
Perhaps more than any other element of al Qaeda, the group
operating from Yemen known as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) now targets American youth with one primary objective in
mind: mobilize and activate their online followers in this country to
commit acts of terrorism. Different from the traditional call to
action from the al Qaeda senior leadership, AQAP's message
provides its online American community with a comic-like
experience, one that equips individuals with the tools they need
while demystifying the path they must take to become their own al
Qaeda superhero.
5. Jarret Brachman, Watching the Watchers, FOREIGN POL'Y, Nov. 10, 2010,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/11/watching-thewatchers.
6. For an in-depth discussion of the ways in which al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula is now targeting an American homegrown support base through strategic
messaging, see Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland - Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP), Hearing Before the Subcomm. Countertenvrism and Intelligence of the H Comm. on
Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. (2011) (testimony of Barak Barfi, Christopher Boucek and
2011] 5229
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Sheikh Anwar Al-Awlaki has become a key engine of growth for
al Qaeda's Western-focused media machine. Although al-Awlaki
has been focused on quietly desensitizing his audiences to a
hardline reading of Islam through his prolific Internet-based video
and audio lectures for over a decade, al-Awlaki's recent shift to
openly and directly calling for violence against the United States
has meant new challenges for America's counterterrorism
professionals.
Al-Awlaki offers AQAP something that few al Qaeda
personalities have been able to do: speak persuasively to an English-
speaking audience without a deep knowledge of Islamic history or
interest in complex theological arguments. To the contrary, al-
Awlaki speaks as a populist about everyday challenges that Muslims
face. This inclusive approach has helped to brand al-Awlaki as one
of al Qaeda's most user-friendly personalities-he has become an al
Qaeda gateway drug, so to speak.
III. INSPIRING ACTION
Perhaps no AQAP media product has blurred the line between
the virtual and physical worlds more than its English-language
magazine, Inspire. Since releasing their first issue of Inspire, AQAP
has continued to pioneer creative ways for empowering and
motivating their online supporters. Although the magazine's
kitschy tactical advice and slick graphical featurettes has made for
compelling headlines, most public discussions about the magazine
have yet to provide an adequate explanation for why Inspire actually
matters.
Certainly the Inspire series has helped make al Qaeda's
personalities and ideology more accessible to more people. But
such intense focus about the magazine's engaging tone and stylistic
attributes reflect the general lowlevel of theoretical sophistication
in the counterterrorism field today. Inspire is far more than just
another propaganda junket released by al Qaeda: it is not just
about getting kids to blindly follow Inspire's recipe for building "a
Jarret Brachman), available at http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-
heaing-%E2%80%9Cterrorist-threat-us-homeland-%E2%80%93-al-qaeda-arabian-
peninsula-aqap%E2%80%9D.
7. For more on the why AI-Awlaki matters in mobilizing American youth, see
Jarret Brachman & Alix Levine, You Too Can Be Awlaki, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.,
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bomb in the kitchen of your mom."-
The real reason that Inspire should be considered such an
achievement for al Qaeda is that it lowers the proverbial wall that
has deterred most online al Qaeda supporters from actually going
operational. Until recently, most of al Qaeda's Internet supporters
have confined their participation to the bounds of their online
communities. It was the exception to the rule that an Internet
supporter would actually log off their computers and pick up a
weapon to go kill in the physical world.
Before individuals like Zachary Chesser and the Fort Hood
shooter Major Nidal Malik Hasang-both of whom had been in
direct email contact with al-Awlaki-there had been few Internet
supporters who became real-world terrorists because the gulf
between thought and action had been too great. The incentives for
bridging that gulf were not compelling enough to entice a mass
migration of online jihadists to the physical world. Political
scientists might refer to this as a freerider problem, where
individuals benefit off of the work being done by others without
paying their share.
With the barriers so high and the incentives for martyrdom so
seemingly distant, most online supporters of al Qaeda kept running
into a glass ceiling. No matter what they did, their global online
supporters remained, by and large, part-time jihadists-logging on
to their favorite websites after work or on weekends. These
armchair enthusiasts do not necessarily help al Qaeda advance its
global objectives in this country. Inspire and al-Awlaki have been
trying to change all that.
IV. TYPES OF AMERICAN INTERNET SUPPORT FOR AL QAEDA
Just as al Qaeda places more pressure on its American
constituency to mobilize and become operational, law enforcement
in this country has grown more perceptive about how Americans
are using the Internet for advancing nefarious and criminal
purposes. A review of recent criminal complaints of individuals
8. An article with this title appeared in AQAP's first issue of Inspire, which
was released in lateJune 2010.
9. See Tara Bahrampour, Out of Suburbia, the Online Extremist, WASH. POST,
Nov. 2, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010
/11/01/AR2010110107035.html; James Dao, Suspect Was 'Mortified' About
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arrested on al Qaeda-related charges highlights at least three
categories of ways that an individual's Internet activity is being
looked at by law enforcement.
In some cases, the Internet has been used as a leading
indicator where one's online activities lead investigators to suspect
that an individual may be breaking the law, or preparing to do so,
in the physical world. Just as a drug addict requires higher
amounts of drugs over time in order to achieve the same high, al
Qaeda's online supporters tend to desire increased amounts of
participatory experiences. These experiences may come in the
form of subcriminal activities, such as arranging al Qaeda-video
watching parties or conducting nonviolent public activism in the
name of al Qaeda. It may also move into the criminal sphere.
Online supporters who seek out more ways of finding their fix tend
to look to illegal acquisition of firearms and ammunition, illicit
travel to warzones and fundraising in the name of al Qaeda or with
the intention of moving funds and material to al Qaeda.
On the one hand, an individual's Internet activities may not be
necessarily illegal, but some are so egregiously advocating violence
that law enforcement is drawn to them under the suspicion that
they may be seeking to operationalize their online rhetoric in the
physical world. Such was the case with Emerson Begolly, whose
extensive online heralding of al Qaeda caught the attention of
federal authorities. 0 The twenty-one-year-old Begolly had become
something of an Internet reality star thanks to his incessant web
presence under several different monikers. Posting on blogs, web
forums, file-sharing sites, and in a variety of other ways, Begolly's
excessive support for al Qaeda via the Internet seemed to attract
the attention of federal law enforcement who followed the trail he
was leaving in the virtual world back to him in the physical world.
Although none of his postings seem to have met the threshold for
being criminal in nature," they did lead law enforcement to his
doorstep, prompting them to dig deeper into his physical world
activities.
In other instances, law enforcement has arrested individuals
10. A Look Into the Troubled Mind of fihadist Emerson Begolly, INTELWIRE.coM
(Jan. 13, 2011), http://news.intelwire.com/2011/01/look-into-troubled-mind-of-
jihadist.html [hereinafter Troubled Mind].
11. See Criminal Complaint, United States v. Begolly, No. 11-4M (W.D. Pa.
Jan. 15, 2011), available at http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com
/documents/201 1/01/criminal-complaint-against-emerson-begolly.php?page=1
(charging Begolly for assaulting a federal employee).
5232 IVol. 37:5
8
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 5 [2011], Art. 19
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss5/19
POLICING AL QAEDA'S ARMY
out of concern for the content of their Internet statements. These
statements may include posts that either threaten the safety and
well-being of specific individuals or make broad threats to conduct
illegal action. An archetypal example of this type of extremism is
Awais Younis, a twenty-five-year-old Virginian who discussed using
explosives in the Washington D.C. area on his Facebook account.
Despite his ideological support for al Qaeda, Younis was charged
for communicating threats across state lines, not material support
.13of terrorists.
Using the Facebook, Younis bragged to a friend that he could
build a pipe bomb with specific types of shrapnel to cause
maximum damage on the Metro system. Younis had also discussed
planting pipe bombs underneath a sewer head in the Georgetown
neighborhood of Washington, D.C. When the friend suggested he
was not serious, Younis responded "watch me."' The friend alerted
the FBI. In a subsequent Facebook chat, Younis threatened the
unidentified tipster and told her that "the problem with Americans
they cant [sic] leave well enough alone until something happens
then they sit there wondering why we dropped the twin towers like
a bad habit."15
The third category of terrorism-related arrests where an
individual's use of the Internet played a prominent role is focused
on the actual legality of their online activities. Such activities
include attempting to recruit members into an operational cell by
way of the Internet, soliciting financing for actual terrorist
operations, and using the Internet to coordinate with others in the
furtherance of a terrorist operation.
Zachary Chesser, a young convert from northern Virginia, is
one individual who falls into this category. Arraigned on multiple
charges-including communicating threats across state lines and
providing material support to terrorists-most of Chesser's web
history appeared in the complaint as evidence for each charge, be
it from posting repeated threats against specific individuals, such as
the creators of the television show South Park, or uploading videos
12. Emily Babay, Facebook Chats Alert Authorities to Va. Man's Bomb Threats,
WASH. EXAMINER, Dec. 12, 2010, http://washingtonexaminer.com/local/crime-
punishment/2010/1 2/facebook-chats-alert-authorities-va-mans-bomb-threats.
13. Id.
14. Affidavit in Support of a Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant at 2,
United States v. Younis, No. 1:10-MJ-812, (E.D. Va. Dec. 12, 2010), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/45068387/Awais-Younis-Complaint.
15. Id. at 5.
2011] 5233
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to al Qaeda-affiliated websites. 6
These cases and numerous others reveal a changing landscape
of terrorism charges in the United States. Far from the
operationally dominated years immediately following the attacks of
September 11, 2001, the past several years have seen such a
saturation of Internet activity by online extremist supporters of al
Qaeda that it has begun spilling over into criminal prosecutions.
The next section will examine each of the above cases in
depth, drawing on the legal documents associated with each case to
demonstrate the importance that an individual's online activities
now seems to play in driving law enforcement behavior and
prosecution strategy.
V. THE INTERNET AS A LEADING INDICATOR
In the new landscape of an al Qaeda-inspired, American
support base, extremist Internet activity has become something of
the proverbial canary in the coal mine-signaling trouble before
otherwise apparent. One way that law enforcement is coming to
understand extremist use of the Internet in this country is as a
signal that an individual is heading down a trajectory that may lead
to violence.
Twenty-one-year-old Emerson Begolly had become one of the
most prolific American-based al Qaeda activists on the Internet.17
Posting under a variety of monikers, Begolly referred to himself on
the al Qaeda-affiliated Internet websites as a "nasheed expert" or a
specialist in the soundtracks commonly featured within al Qaeda
propaganda videos." Few online users in these forums could boast
the size of his personal nasheed collection or the scope of
knowledge that Begolly had about those nasheeds. Because of his
niche interest in nasheeds, Begolly quickly rose in prominence.
It was also that prominence in the al Qaeda virtual space that
brought him to the attention of the law enforcement community.
On January 4, 2011, two federal agents approached Begolly to
make contact with him in the parking lot of a Burger King in New
16. Criminal Information at 2-5, United States v. Chesser, No.1:10-CR-395
(E.D. Va. Oct. 20, 2010), available at http://intelfiles.egoplex.com/2010-10-20-
chesser-criminal-info.pdf.
17. Troubled Mind, supra note 10.
18. Rusty Shackleford, Morons at TPM: Begolly Isn't So Bad, just a Loner Who
Snapped; Morons at jawa Report: Wow, Are You Guys Lazy or Just Stupid?, THE JAWA
REPORT (Jan. 10, 2011, 4:19 PM), http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/205788.php.
5234 [Vol. 37:5
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Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. Upon opening the door to his car,
Begolly "screamed and immediately reached toward his jacket."19
Thinking he was reaching for a gun, the agents sought to restrain
him. In the course of the struggle, he allegedly bit them both. He
was also found to be carrying a concealed, loaded 9 millimeter
pistol.2 o
According to a criminal complaint filed after he was detained
for biting the agents, Begolly was already a subject of a criminal
investigation and agents had reason to believe that he might be
armed when they approached him.' Investigators went on to
conduct searches at Begolly's father's home in Redbank,
Pennsylvania and his mother's home in Natrona Heights,
Pennsylvania. Although they did not explain what specifically they
were seeking to find in those searches, investigators did present
evidence of Begolly posting anti-Semitic and pro-al Qaeda messages
online in support of the detention hearing.
In his affidavit, "FBI Special Agent Thomas Ferguson III
testified [that] some of the messages described how to turn a
station wagon into a bomb, how to buy a firearm, how to rig a
firearm from a flare gun and how to sabotage railroad tracks."
None of Begolly's online activities rose to criminal conduct,
however, Ferguson explained.23 "Putting out instructions on how to
make a bomb, as harebrained as that may be and as dangerous as it
is, is still free speech," he said.2 "On the other hand, the postings
could be considered 'material support' to terrorists if the
instructions were given to someone Begolly believed would use
them."2 5
The case of Antonio Martinez offers another look into how law
enforcement is trying to make sense of individuals who are openly
calling for illegal behavior in the virtual space but not necessarily
breaking the law in the physical world. "Before Martinez began
19. See Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint at 2, United States v.





22. Brian Bowling, National Security Law Put into Play in Begolly Case,
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posting radical, anti-American messages on his Facebook wall, he
worked retail, selling children's clothes in a Maryland shopping
mall.""
According to his Facebook profile, Martinez attended Laurel
High School in Maryland in 2005 and is married.2 1 "Martinez
[had] been arrested before, but the charges against him were far
from terror-related. In 2006, Martinez was charged with armed
robbery in Montgomery County, Md., when he was 16, according to
court records.... And in 2008, he was convicted of theft and was
sentenced to 90 days in jail." 2 But in 2010, after newly converting
to Islam, Martinez began to post hostile messages openly on
Facebook."
In late September 2010, Martinez posted on his Facebook wall
that "[t]he sword is cummin the reign of oppression is about 2
cease inshallah ta'ala YA muslimeen! don't except the free world
we are slaves of the Most High and never forget it!" o Several days
later, he posted to Facebook that "Any I who opposes ALLAH and
HIS Prophet PEACE.Be.upon.Him I Hate u with all my heart."31
While in no way illegal, it was his extremist Internet activities that
initially put him on the radar of authorities.
Martinez's Facebook posts were apparently so concerning to
his unnamed associate that he reported Martinez to the federal
32
authorities. It was only after his online postings had brought him
to the attention of law enforcement that Martinez dove headlong
into preparations for an actual terrorist attack.
VI. HOSTILE CONTENT
In a growing number of cases, American al Qaeda supporters
seeking to emulate their al Qaeda heroes, particularly Anwar al-
Awlaki, use the Internet as a proxy for real action. They use it to
vent their anger and frustration. The word becomes their weapon.
26. Mara Gay, Who Is Accused Baltimore Terrorist Antonio Martinez?, AOLNEWS




29. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint at 3, United States v.
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And the anonymity of the Internet provides just enough cover for
them to weaponize those words without deep reflection on the
consequences. Awais Younis, the twenty-five-year-old man from
Arlington, Virginia, was arrested on charges of making threatening
communications across state lines. Younis used his personal
Facebook page in order to threaten to set off explosives, according
to an affidavit for his arrest by a special agent with the FBI's Joint
Terrorism Task Force. The documents say Younis described how
to build a pipe bomb and advocated placing bombs on the third
and fifth cars of Washington, D.C., Metro trains because they "had
the highest number of commuters on them and he could place
pipe bombs in these locations and would not be noticed."35 Younis
also said he could put a bomb under a sewer head in Georgetown
at rush hour "to produce the greatest number of casualties."36
Using Facebook's chat feature, Younis told an unnamed associate
who alerted authorities, that "you should be nervous.... [Y]ou
want a reason to complain out me [sic] and my people. [11] will give
,,37
you one.
It was the hostile content of Younis's Facebook posts, not his
acquisition of bomb materials, attempt to recruit others, or efforts
to raise funds that got him arrested. The same became true for
Zachary Adam Chesser, better known by his Internet sobriquet of
"Abu Talhah al-Amrikee," the 20 year old Virginia man who was
indicted for supporting a Somali-based al-Qaida affiliate, Al-
Shabab . Most Americans learned of him in April 2010, when
Chesser's media stunt wishing death upon the creators of the South
Park cartoon thrust him into the national spotlight.
Similar to Awais Younis, whose Internet content was deemed so
hostile that he was arrested for it, Chesser was charged for his
Internet threats. But Chesser's charges went beyond that of Younis.
"Under the banner of his 'Abu Talhah al-Amrikee' brand, Chesser
wanted to fundamentally transform English-language jihadist
online activism. He was trying to narrow the gap between the
rudimentary thinking of American jihadists and the more advanced
33. Affidavit at 1, supra note 14.
34. Id. at 2.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 5.
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thinking among Arab jihadists."'9 To do that, the Internet became
40
his primary tool for action.
In support of their case, the prosecution presented a laundry
list of evidence about Chesser's online activities. This included
specific mentions of videos he uploaded to YouTube on specific
dates, postings to various blogs, including one titled "How to Help
the Mujahideen." 41 "A search of Chesser's home uncovered a
handwritten note called 'How to Destroy the West' that contained a
bulleted list of activities."4  The prosecution charged Chesser with
transmitting communications by Internet postings that threatened
to injure the creators of the cartoon South Park and reposting clips
from Anwar al-Awlaki demanding that Muslims assassinate anyone
who blasphemes the Prophet Muhammad.
VII. THE INTERNET'S INSTRUMENTAL ROLE
Although Chesser was found guilty on the charge of making
threatening communications, he had been charged on two
additional counts. After being pulled from a plane bound for
Africa with his infant son, Chesser was indicted in the Eastern
District of Virginia on charges of soliciting others to threaten
violence and material support to terrorists. Chesser's online
postings provided the authorities with the probable cause they
needed to arrest him.
The charge of soliciting others to engage in violent or
threatening conduct was evidenced by the broad calls he made in
his Internet postings and blog posts for others to leave suspicious
packages that looked like package bombs in public places. Even
though these packages were otherwise harmless, their purpose was
to desensitize the public and law enforcement authorities to the
threat of actual package bombs. He also posted the entire leaked
United States Transportation Security Administration manual titled
Aviation Security Screening Management Standard Operating Procedures
with the goal of helping others to thwart those safeguards.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Affidavit at 11, United States v. Chesser, No. 1:10-MJ-00504-TCB (E.D. Va.
Sept. 21, 2010), available at http://intelfiles.egoplex.com/2010-07-21-chesser-
affidavit.pdf.
42. Terror Suspect Pleads Guilty in Threat against South Park Creators, CNN.cOM
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Additionally, he posted a link to 200 "books on Jihad, Islam
and Warfare," and in which, under a section titled "Preparation,"
he included a book, titled "Guerilla Air Defense, Antiaircraft Weapons
and Techniques for Guenilla Forces containing, among other items,
information on the construction of antiaircraft missiles, and tactics,
techniques and weapons for targeting aircraft, including jet
airplanes and helicopters."43
Finally, with regard to the charge of material support to a
designated terrorist organization, Chesser was charged both
individually and through recruitment of other personnel, publicity,
and training to the foreign terrorist organization al Shabaab. He
was charged for his attempt to travel to Somalia to fight for, and at
the direction of, al Shabaab. Chesser was also charged for his
posting of material related to violent jihad and its tactics on the
Internet for, and at the instruction of, al Shabaab.4
What is important to recognize is that the overwhelming
amount of evidence presented by the prosecution in order to
support the charges against Chesser's al Qaeda-related activities was
tied to his use of the Internet. For Chesser, the Internet was an
instrument by which he could advance al Qaeda's agenda in this
country without actually having to conduct an attack. Believing
himself to be safe from arrest because he was engaged in what he
thought were subcriminal activities protected by the First
Amendment, Chesser, like a growing number of American al
Qaeda supporters, wielded the Internet as a tool by which he could
proselytize, provide counsel, and even conduct rhetorical attacks.
VIII. CONCLUSION
America's law enforcement community is finding itself having
to reconceptualize its understanding of what constitutes support
for terrorism. Rather than the conventional ways of viewing
support-acquisition of explosives, fundraising, clandestine
recruiting, and other operational tasks-al Qaeda's strategic
recalibration has introduced a wholly new dimension to American
homegrown terrorism.
Rhetorical support by way of the Internet is now being
43. Statement of Facts at 12, United States v. Chesser, No. 1:10-cr-00395-LO
(E.D. Va. Oct. 20, 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted, italics added),
available at http://s88179113.onlinehome.us/2010-10-27/USA.KvChesser-
Statement of Facts.pdf.
44. For more about Chesser's online activities, see Brachman, supra note 38.
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promoted as an equivalent way to support al Qaeda in the United
States. By making a website, sending a text message, posting on
Facebook, or uploading a video to YouTube, an individual can, in
essence, become al Qaeda.
Al Qaeda's hope is that, by hooking an individual at a low,
subcriminal level of participation, the individual will organically
and spontaneously decide to commit a terrorist attack. But short of
that decision, they are content to cultivate an army of rhetorical
soldiers.
The challenge for law enforcement in this country is twofold.
First, as a growing number of individuals engage in behavior that
teeters on the line of legality, resources become increasingly
stretched. That, however, is part of al Qaeda's grand strategy.
Since law enforcement cannot actively monitor all of the lone
voices espousing pro-al Qaeda sentiment for the one or two who
decide to go operational, they will invariably allow some to filter
through the cracks.
On the flip side, as law enforcement seeks to ferret out those al
Qaeda supporters who demonstrate a greater likelihood of going
operational, or whose online rhetoric crosses the line of legality, al
Qaeda believes that they will invariably alienate other Muslims in
this country, including Muslims who do not support violence or
extremism. That alienation, however inadvertent it may have been,
will only contribute to the ranks of those fertile for future
recruitment. America's law enforcement community must
therefore tread carefully and vigilantly, ensuring that it strives to
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